Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

State of Utah v. David Craig Carlsen : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Scott L. Wyatt; Logan City Prosecutor; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee.
David Craig Carlsen; Appellant in Pro Se.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Carlsen, No. 930372 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5302

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

C5SSF
DOC
KF«J

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

33Eair&_

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 930372-CA

-vs-

Case Type:

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,

APPEAL

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

AN APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE
LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT, THE HONORABLE
ROGER S. DUTSON, JUDGE PRESIDING

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN
P.O. Box 148
Logan, Utah 84323-0148
Appellant in Pro Se
SCOTT L. WYATT
Logan City Prosecutor
255 North Main
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: (801) 750-9807
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

FILED
JAN 1 9 1995

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Jurisdictional Statement

1

Statement of Issues Presented

1-2

Determinative Laws

2-3

Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case

3

Course of Proceedings

3-5

Statement of Facts
Summary of Argument

. . . . .

5-11
11

Argument:
Point I: The Application of Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-62 in this case violated the separation
of powers provision of the Utah Constitution and
rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague . . .11-14
Conclusion

14-15

Certificate of Service

15

Addendum

16

Jury Instruction of Element of Offense

17

Information

18

Motion to Dismiss

19

Motion to Suppress

20

Determinative Laws

21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED

Page

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352
75 L.Ed.2d 903, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (1983)

14

State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d.1321 (Utah 1986)

14

State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977)

12

State v. Johnson, 44 Utah 18, 137 P. 632 (1913) . . . .

12

STATUTUES CITED
Utah Code Annotated, § 41-6-62

1-15

Utah Code Annotated, § 77-18a-l

1

Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-3(d)

1

Utah Code Annotated, § 78-4-11

1

RULES CITED
Rule 23 of the Utah Criminal Procedures

4

Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure . . . .

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS CITED
Article V, § 1, Utah Constitution

1,12,14

Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution . . .

1-15

-ii-

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff/Appellee,

]i Case No. 930372-CA

-vs-

]i Case Type:

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,

|>

Defendant/Appellant.

APPEAL

Priority No. 2

]

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a criminal judgment in the First
Circuit Court, County of Cache, State of Utah, Logan City
Department pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26 of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l,
(1953 as amended).

The jurisdiction is invoked upon this

Honorable Court to entertain this appeal under the provisions
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(d), and § 78-4-11, (1953 as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether or not the statute under which the Defendant

was charged and convicted, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 (1987
Amendment) is unconstitutionally vague as applied and enforced
in this case in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
whether the trial court violated the Separation of Powers
provision under Article V, § 1 of the Utah Constitution by
altering the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 in its
instruction to the jury as to the elements of the offense
-1-

of Following another Vehicle Too Closely.
The standard of review to review this issue on appeal
is that Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's decision
on the constitutionality of the statute for correctness,
according no deference to its legal conclusions.
James, 819 P.2d 781, 796 (Utah 1991).

State v.

Court of Appeals will

not rewrite a statute or ignore its plain language in order
to reach a constitutional construction.

Provo City Corp. v.

Wilden, 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989).
The Defendant preserved this issue for appeal by first
raising the issue of the constitutionality of the statute by
filing a written Motion to Dismiss the Information in the
Logan City Municipal Justice Court.

The Justice Court denied

the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss on December 11, 1992.

The

Defendant again raised the issue of the constitutionality of
the statute, § 41-6-62 in the trial denovo in the Circuit Court
by making a verbal Motion in Arrest of Judgment after the verdict
of the jury and prior to imposition of sentence on March 26,
1993.
DETERMINATIVE LAWS
The following determinative laws of this case are set
forth in verbatim in the Addendum:
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 (1987 Amendment).
Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution.
Article V, § 1, Utah Constitution.
-2-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case:
The Defendant was initially charged by Information in the

Logan City Municipal Justice Court with one count of Following
another Vehicle Too Closely in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-62, (1987 Amendment), a class C misdemeanor.
B.

Course of Proceedings:
The Defendant prior to a bench trial in the Logan City

Municipal Justice Court filed a written Motion to Dismiss the
Information on grounds that the statute under which he was
charged was unconstitutionally vague both on its face and as
applied in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The Defendants Motion to Dismiss was denied by the Justice
Court on December 11, 1992. A bench trial proceeded as scheduled
on that same date and the Justice Court Judge sitting without a
jury rendered a verdict of guilty against the Defendant for the
offense of Following another Vehicle Too Closely in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 as charged in the Information.

Judgment

and sentence was imposed the same day whereupon the Defendant
was sentenced to pay a $ 50.00 fine and to serve four days in
jail to be suspended upon payment of the fine. The Defendant
thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal to appeal his conviction to
the First Circuit Court of the State of Utah, County of Cache,
Logan City Department.
-3-

A hearing on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Information
was held in the First Circuit Court on January 26, 1993 where
the Court reserved a decision on Defendant's Motion until all
of the facts were to be adduced at trial.
A hearing was held on February 0, 1993 in the First Circuit
Court on on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence on the basis
that Logan City Police Officer, Russell J. Roper did not have
a reasonable articulate suspicion to believe that the Defendant
had committed a criminal offense or engaged in criminal activity
by seizing the Defendant by making a U-turn from a parked position
and following and thereafter stopping the Defendant.

The Court

on the same date denied the Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
A jury trial was held in the First Circuit Court on March
26, 1993.

The jury returned a verdict of guilty to the offense

of following another vehicle too closely.

The Defendant made

a verbal motion in arrest of judgment pursuant to Rule 23 of
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure on the grounds that the
evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to sustain the conviction and on the basis that statute under which he was convicted, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 as applied and enforced against
the Defendant was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.

The Circuit Court denied the Defendant's

Motion in Arrest of Judgment and thereupon imposed judgment and
sentence on the same date.
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The Defendant thereafter timely filed a Motion for a New
Trial in the First Circuit Court on grounds that the prosecutor
knowingly used the false testimony of Russell J. Roper, first
to avoid suppression of the evidence at the suppression hearing
and/ secondly, at trial to obtain a conviction against the
Defendant.

A further basis for Defendant's Motion for a New

Trial was that the jury was improperly influenced by the Court's
numerous statements and remarks during Officer Roper's testimony
giving such testimony greater weight and depriving the Defendant
of a fair and impartial jury trial.

The trial court without

conducting a hearing, denied the Defendant's Motion for a New
trial on the 5th day of May, 1993.

The Defendant filed his

Notice of Appeal to appeal his conviction to the Utah Court of
Appeals on the 4th day of June, 1993.
C.

Statement of Facts:
This case in reality began in December, 1988, when the

Defendant was acquitted of charges brought against him for the
offense of Driving on Revocation by Russell J. Roper and former
Logan City Police Officer, Greg Monroe in a jury trial held in
the First Circuit Court.

An additional count of Driving on

Revocation was also dismissed by the Court because of the lack
of any Notice by Driver License Services to the Defendant that
his License had been revoked.
The Defendant ever since said acquittal has filed numerous
complaints against Officer Roper with the F.B.I.; Mayor of the
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City of Logan; Chief of the Logan City Police Department;
various Lieutenants of the Logan City Police Department; and
one complaint to Logan City Prosecutor, Scott L. Wyatt who
prosecuted this case, claiming that whenever Officer Roper
observed him driving or walking down the streets of Logan City,
Officer Roper would make a U-turn and stalk and harrass the
Defendant by following the Defendant for substantial distances
through the Logan City street for no apparent reason.

Dispite,

the Defendant's numerous complaints against Officer Roper, he
continued to follow and harrass the Defendant as evidenced by
the facts of this case.
The Defendant was lawfully driving in a southerly direction
on 100 East in Logan, Utah on November 7, 1992.

The Defendant

drove pass Officer Roper's vehicle which was parked in a
northerly direction on the east side of the road at 300 North.
Upon observing the Defendant, Officer Roper immediately made a
U-turn from a parked position as the Defendant drove pass and
began following and stalking the Defendant.

The Defendant after

being followed by Officer Roper for a three block distance made
a right hand turn at Center Street to drive in a westerly
direction.

Officer Roper also made a right hand turn and

followed the Defendant in a westerly direction.

The Defendant

immediately pulled to the right side of the road to avoid being
followed by this particular Officer.

Officer Roper drove pass

the Defendant's vehicle very slowly.

The Defendant pulled back
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onto the roadway to drive in a westerly direction.

Officer

Roper turned at the intersection of Center Street and Main to
drive in a notherly direction.

The Defendant made a turn at

the same intersection to drive in a northerly direction.
Officer Roper was stopped at a red traffic semaphore at the
intersection of 200 North and Main Street to drive in a northerly direction.

The Defendant drove into the right-hand turn lane

and stopped at the light at the same intersection.

The Defendant

made a right hand turn to drive in a easterly direction on 200
North.

Officer Roper immediately turned right from the lane

to drive in a northerly direction on Main and drove east and
stopped behind the Defendant's vehicle.

He approached the

Defendant's vehicle and issued the Defendant a citation for
following him too closely.

[Officer Roper at the suppression

hearing testified that he made a U-turn from a parked position
at 300 North and 100 East for no apparent reason.

He testified

that he was not intentionally following the Defendant, that he
just happened to be driving in the same direction as the Defendant
and at no time did he stop or seize the Defendant.

Officer Roper

at trial testified that he made a U-turn from the same parked
position and that he was intentionally following the Defendant
because he could not tell whether the Defendant's vehicle
registration had expired while observing the Defendant drive
pass him from his parked position at 300 North and 100 East.]
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Officer Roper testified at the trial held in the First
Circuit Court on March 26, 1993, that after turning onto Main
Street from Center Street on November 7, 1992, he was driving
in a northerly direction at approximately 25 miles per hour
while looking into his rear view mirror.

He testified that

while looking into his rear view mirror, the Defendant was
following him too closely at approximately 25 North Main.

He

testified that based upon his experience in accident investigations
and numerous assumptions, the Defendant's vehicle would have
struck his vehicle based upon the assumption that he suddenly
stopped.

He testified that he could not recall what type of

traffic was upon Main Street on November 7, 1992.

There was no

testimony adduced from Officer Roper or at trial as to the
conditions of Main Street such as was the roadway dry; wet;
or covered with ice or snow.
Officer Roper on cross-examination admitted that there was
no accident between the vehicles on November7, 1992.
admitted that some mirrors are deceptive.

He also

He admitted that

prior to November 7, 1992, the Defendant had previously filed
numerous complaints against him for his alleged stalking,
harrassing, and following the Defendant.

He testified that the

Defendant had filed so many complaints against him that he could
not recount them all and that there had been publications in the
Herald Journal relating to his harrassment of the Defendant.

He

also admitted that the Logan City Police Department does not have
an Internal Affairs Division to investigate police misconduct and
that no disciplinary action has been taken against him.
-8-

The Defendant testified at the same trial that after turning
onto Main Street from Center Street on November 7, 1992, he was
driving behind Officer Roper at a distance of at least 15 feet
and that he was driving at a rate of approximately 15 miles per
hour.

He testified that in about a quarter block distance

another vehicle changed lanes and pulled behind Officer Roper's
vehicle and in front of the Defendant's vehicle.

He testified

that when he arrived at the intersection of 200 North and Main
Street, Officer Roperfs vehicle was stopped at the red light
with one vehicle in front of him and one vehicle in back of him
while in the lane to drive in a northerly direction.

He testified

that he made a right hand turn at this intersection to drive in
a easterly direction on 200 North.

He testified that immediately

after turning onto 200 North, Officer Roper's vehicle made an
easterly turn onto 200 and turned on his red emergency lights.
The Defendant testified that he pulled to the right side of the
roadway and stopped.

Officer Roper approached his vehicle and

requested Defendant's Driver License and Registration.

The

Defendant testified testified that Officer Roper issued him a
citation.

He testified that at the time Officer Roper issued the

citation that Officer Roper wrote a phone number on the back of
the citation and stated "if you have any more complaints about me
harrassing you, call this phone number."

[Officer Roper testified

during the course of the trial that the phone number that he
wrote on the back of the citation was that of the Logan City
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Municipal Justice Court (750-7112), but could not recall any
specific reason for writing the number on the back of the
citation.]
The Defendant testified that he had filed numerous complaints
against Officer Roper for harrassment ever since December of
1988.

The Defendant testified on at least 100 different

occassions prior to November 7, 1992, Officer Roper would make
a U-turn when he observed the Defendant driving or walking and
follow him to the grocery store; place of employment; defendant's
immediate family's place of business; and numerous other places.
The Defendant testified that despite his complaints against
Officer Roper, he would continue to harrass, follow and stalk
the Defendant.
The Defendant during the course of the trial was not accorded
any opportunity to object to the trial court's instruction to
the jury.
The Defendant did take exception to trial court's instruction
to the jury on the elements of the offense of Following another
Vehicle Too Closely because the elements were different and
because the instruction did not require the jury to consider the
factors of the traffic upon and the conditions of the highway
as defined under Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62. [Instruction No. 12].
The Defendant also took exception to the trial court's
failure to give the standard Instruction given in all cases that
"If you believe any witness has wilfully testified falsely, as
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to any material fact in this case, you are at liberty to
disregard the whole of the testimony of such witness, except
as he/she may have been corroborated by other credible
witnesses or credible evidence.
The jury during their deliberations requested the trial
court for additional instructions as to whether they could
return with a recommendation rather than a verdict of guilty
or innocense.

The trial court instructed them that they would

be required to return a verdict of guilty or not guilty.

The

jury after further deliberation returned a verdict of guilty.
The Defendant thereupon made a verbal motion in arrest
of judgment because of the insufficient evidence adduced at the
trial and on grounds that the statute under which he was tried
and convicted, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 was unconstitutionally
vague and applied and enforced in the case.

The trial court

denied Defendant's Motion in Arrest of Judgment and thereafter
imposed judgment and sentence.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Following Too Closely statute, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62,
as applied and enforced in this case was unconstitutionally
vague and as applied and enforced by the trial court violated
the Separation of Powers provision under Article V, § 1 of
the Utah Constitution.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
-11-

THE APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-62 IN THIS CASE
VIOLATED THE SEPARATION OF POWERS PROVISION OF THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION AND RENDERED THE STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE.
The Defendant contends that the application and enforcement of the Following Too Closely statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-62, (1987 Amendment) violation the separation of
pwoers provision of Article V, § 1 of the Utah Constitution
and rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Gallion, 572 P.2d
683, 687, (Utah 1977) held that the determination of the
elements of a crime and the appropriate punishment therefor
are under our [Utah] Constitutional system, judgments, which
must be made exclusively by the legislature.
The Defendant in this case was charged by Information with
the offense of Following another Vehicle Too Closely in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62.
The elements of the offense of Following another vehicle
too closely as enacted by the Utah Legislature under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 are as follows:
(1) The operator of a vehicle may not follow another
vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent,
having regard for the speed of the vehicles and the
traffic upon and the condition of the highway.
The Utah Supreme Court held that it is for the legislature,
not the courts, to define what constitutes criminal conduct.
State v. Johnson, 44 Utah 18, 137 P. 632 (1913).
The trial court instructed the jury [Instruction No. 12]
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as to the elements necessary for a conviction of Following
another Vehicle Too Closely as follows:
Before you may convict the Defendant of following
too close, you must find from the evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements
of that crime, to-wit:
1. That the Defendant was driving a motor vehicle at
the time and place as alleged in the Information.
2. That the Defendant was driving in Logan City,
Cache County, State of Utah.
3. That the distance maintained by the defendant
between vehicles was not reasonable and prudent.
There was no instruction given to the jury that it would
be necessary for them to consider the factors as to the
traffic upon and the conditions of the highway as defined
under § 41-6-62 based upon the evidence adduced at trial.
The Defendant in this case was not found guilty by the
jury of the offense of Following Too Close as enacted by the
Utah Legislature under § 41-6-62, but was convicted for the
offense of Following Too Close as created and defined by the
trial court in its instructions to the jury.
The trial court's elimination to the two factors to be
considered by the jury of the traffic upon and the conditions
of the highway as defined under § 41-6-62 violated the separation
of powers provisions under Article V, § 1 of the Utah Constitution.
The trial court had no constitutional authority to give a jury
instruction which describes a criminal offense differently
-13-

than as the offense was enacted by the Utah Legislature.
The Defendant further contends that the offense of
Following Too Close as defined by the trial court in its
instruction to the jury is unconstitutionally vague in violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.

352, 357-358, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 909, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (1983).
The Defendant in this case did not receive actual notice
prior to trial on March 26, 1993 that the offense of Following
Too Close was defined as the offense was defined in the trial
courtfs instruction to the jury as to the elements of the
offense.

State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986).

What was reasonable and prudent to the Defendant was not
reasonable and prudent to Officer Roper.
Furthermore, the offense of Following Too Close as defined
by the trial court failed to establish minimal guidelines to
govern law enforcement in their enforcement of the offense.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant respectfully submits that the application and
enforcement of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-62 and the trial court's
instructions as to the elements of the offense, violated the
separation of powers provisions of Article V, § 1 of the Utah
Constitution and rendered the statute unconstitutionally vague
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as applied and enforced in this case in violation of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.

The Defendant respectfully

submits that on the foregoing basis and on the basis that
he was not convicted by the jury for the offense of Following
Too Close as defined by the Utah Legislature under Utah Code
Ann. § 41-6-62, his conviction for the offense of Following
Too Close should be reversed by this Honorable Court.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 19th day of January, 1995.

DAVID CRAIG CARL^N
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the following listed
below on this 19th day of January, 1995:
Scott L. Wyatt
Logan City Prosecutor
255 North Main
Logan, Utah 84321

^^hyi^^^^
DAVID CRAIG CARE&EN

-15-

A D D E N D U M
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INSTRUCTION NO.

Before you may convict the Defendant of following too cl«se/ you must
find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt/ all of the following
elements of that crime, to-wit:
1.

That the Defendant was driving a motor vehicle at the time and
place as alleged in the Information.

2.

That the Defendant was driving in Logan City, Cache County, State
of Utah.

3.

That the distance maintained by the defendant between vehicles

was not reasonable and prudent.
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of the
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt/ it is your
duty to find the defendant guilty of this offense.

On the other hand, if

the evidence has failed to so establish one or more of the said elements,
then you should find the defendant not guilty of this offense.

IN THE LOGAN CITY MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
]>

Plaintiff
vs.

;

CARLSEN, David Craig
316 South Main #9
Logan, Utah
3/5/45
Defendant

]

I N F O R M A T I O N

No.

92-6555

]

The STATE OF UTAH, upon evidence and belief, charges the above-named
Defendant with the commission of the following public offense(s):
COUNT 1:
CRIME: FOLLOWING TOO CLOSE
CLASSIFICATION: CLASS C MISDEMEANOR
IN VIOLATION OF: 41-6-62, Utah Code Annotated
AT: Logan, Utah
ON OR ABOUT:
11/7/92
The acts of the Defendant constituting the public offense(s) were:
That the said Defendant, being the driver of a motor vehicle, did then and there
on the streets of Logan City, follow another vehicle more closely than was
reasonable and prudent having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the
traffic upon the conditions of the street.
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses:
R. J. ROPER, LCPD
R. J. PETERSON, LCPD

DATED:/2 - / - ?^~

DAMAGES:

Date Filed:

YES

NO

/,?-/- Q£L

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN
Defendant in Pro Se
P.O. Box 148
Logan, Utah 84323-0148
LOGAN CITY MUNICIPAL JUSTICE COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
^ . ,.„

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
-vsDAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,
Defendant.

Case No.

92-06555

COMES NOW, the above-named defendant, David Craig Carlsen,
and hereby respectfully moves this Honorable Court for an Order
dismissing the Information and charges filed against the defendant
in the above-entitled matter.
The basis for this motion is that the Following Too Close
statute, U.C.A. Section 43-6-62, (]953 as amended) under which the
defendant is charged for violating is unconstitutionally vague
both on its face and as applied by Logan City Police Officer
Russell Roper in violation of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah
Constitution and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution, State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d
1321 (Utah 1986 and State v. Bradshaw, 541 P.2d 800 (Utah 1975).

DATED this 7th day of December, 1992.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Motion to Dismiss to Scott L,. Wyatt, Logan City Prosecutor,
located at 255 North Main, Logan, Utah, 84321, and the Cache
County Attorney's Office located at 110 North 100 West, Logan,
Utah, 84321, postage prepaid and by placing the same in a U.S.
Mailbox on this 7th day of December, 1992.

DAVID CRAIG CARLSEN
Defendant in Pro Se
P.O. Box 348
Logan, Utah 84323-0148
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAH,
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Plaintiff,
EVIDENCE
-vsDAVID CRAIG CARLSEN,
Defendant.

Case No.

92500323]

COMES NOW, the above-named defendant, David Craig Carlsen,
and hereby respectfully moves this Honorable Court for an Order
to suppress the evidence and testimony of Logan City Police Officer,
Russell J. Roper.
The basis for this motion is that Russell J. Roper did not
have a reasonable suspicion or articulable suspicion based upon
objective facts that the defendant had committed a crime or involved
in criminal activity on the alleged date of the incident when Officer
Roper made a U-turn from a parked position and began stalking or
following the defendant's vehicle and thereafter stopping said
defendant, and issuing a citation to defendant in lieu of an arrest.
As the evidence at a hearing on this matter will show, the defendant
prior to the date of this alleged incident has filed numerous

complaints against Officer Russell J. Roper with the Logan City
Mayor, Logan City Police Department, Logan City Prosecutor, Scott L.
Wyatt; and an agent for the F.B.I, claiming that Russell J. Roper
has continued to stalk or follow the defendant while on duty
through the streets and sidewalks of Logan City without a reasonable
or articulable suspicion that defendant has committed a crime or
involved in criminal activity since the time the defendant was
acquitted of charges of Driving on Revocation at proceedings held
in First Circuit Court in December, 1988 of which said charges were
brought against the defendant by Russell J. Roper and Officer Greg
Monroe of the Logan City Police Department.

The said stalking or

following of the defendant has deprived the defendant of his rights
to free locomotion and the right to travel as secured under the
privileges and immunities under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 at 634 (3969); and Memorial Hospital v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).

Russell J. Roper stalking

or following the defendant on the alleged date of this incident was
based upon a mere "hunch"

and perhaps retaliation for the numerous

complaints filed against him by the defendant and was not based upon
any reasonable or articulable suspicion and the testimony of Russell
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J. Roper and all evidence should be suppressed as being the fruits
of the poisonous tree.

DATED this 14th day of January, 1993,

DAVID CRAIG CSRLSEN J#

H^

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I hand-delivered a true and exact copy of the
foregoing Motion to Suppress Evidence to Scott L. Wyatt, Attorney
for Plaintiff by leaving a copy thereof at the Logan City Prosecutor's
Office located at 255 North Main, Logan, Utah on this ]4th day of
January, ]993.
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41-6-63.10

TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

41-6-62. Following another vehicle — Safe distance — Caravan or motorcade — Exception for funeral procession.
(1) The operator of a vehicle may not follow another vehicle more closely
than is reasonable and prudent, having regard for the speed of the vehicles
and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.
(2) Motor vehicles operated upon any roadway outside of an urban district,
whether in a caravan, motorcade, or otherwise, or whether or not towing other
vehicles, shall allow sufficient space between each vehicle or combination of
vehicles to enable any other vehicle to enter and occupy the space without
danger. This provision does not apply to funeral processions.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 52; C. 1943,
57-7-129; L. 1949, ch. 65, * 1; 1975, ch. 207,
fi 19; 1978, ch. 33, § 15; 1987, ch. 138, § 61.
AMENDMENTS

Amend. XIV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section

f S1z e n s h i p - Due process of law - E q u a l
Vtection.]

4. [Public debt not to bequestioned - Debt*>of
the Confederacy and claims not

2. {Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

ARTICLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS
Section
1. [Three departments of government.]

Section 1. [Three departments of f - J ^ ^

^

int0

The powers of the ^ e r ^ e n ^ n ^ ^ f ^ J ^

*•

***£

three distinct d e p u t e £ e
^
and no person charged ^ e *x e ^ X functions appertaining to either of the
these departments shall
™ J . ^ ^ i y directed or permitted,
others, except in the cases herein express y
Legislative department, Utah Const., Art.
a

s

s

i

s

t

Executive depart-

^ r d e ^ e n f u ^Const., Art. VDL

V L ^ ^

^

Const., Art. VI, i 28.

not

delegable,
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